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THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS.
BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.
WHILE wrestling some time ago with a more or less philo-
sophical problem I found it necessary, and at the same time
a pleasure, to make frequent reference to Kant, Spinoza, Maudsley,
Spencer, Fouillee, Mills, and to that sublime pessimist, Schopen-
hauer. The last made most appropriate reading for that particular
time, the one hundred and thirty-second anniversary of his birth,
and exactly seventy years since he said :".... when I note the
profound impression my philosophy has made upon even the lay-
men of today I hardly dare to think of the role it will play in
1900 "
Now 1900 has come and gone and twenty-one more years and
we are, perhaps, as profoundly impressed with the various systems
of philosophy as their authors could well have desired or hoped for,
yet all things appear to us much as they did to the men of 1800, to
those of 100, and those of 10,000 before our era, in different as-
pects, under varying colorings, sometimes brilliant and pleasing, and
oft'times dull and gloom-inspiring, depending upon the age, the
hour, whether a healthy activity forces one out into Nature, or that
we allow ourselves to lapse into sombre introspection, within our-
selves. The universe changes not, we are the changeful element.
Reading these masters, one feels, with Beaussire, that it is
difficult indeed to establish anything like a direct connection be-
tween any system of philosophy and the actual state of our ideas of
today. Skepticism regarding all such systems and even all ques-
tions of principle has become general. They are superannuated,
and we fight shy of all that lies beycmd positive, actual, palpable
fact. They are considered dangerous and some of us believe actually
compromising to that confidence that is or ought to be the principal
directing force in our notions of morality. They are set aside in
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the name of positive science and in the interest of moral order itself.
Even the idealists, those sensitive souls whose very idealism is
but a sort of sauce or savory that they dare not subject to a too
analytical examination, look not with favor upon those systems,
those questions. Renan, himself, an idealist among idealists, re-
fined and delicate of touch, claimed that the origin of virtue was in
each one of us, not a system, and that "of the twenty or more philo-
sophical theories upon the 'foundation of duty' not one of them
could stand the light of even a most superficial examination. The
transcendental significance of a virtuous act is, and justly, that in
doing it we do not exactly know why we do it. A hero, if he begins
to reflect upon his heroic actions, soon feels that he has acted un-
reasoningly, perhaps idiotically, and it is exactly for that reason
that he is a hero. He obeys an order from the highest authority,
an infallible oracle, a voice that orders most clearly within each one
of us, and that never prefaces its orders with reasons and explana-
tions "
This joining of a skepticism, so satisfied with itself, to senti-
ments so near akin to mysticism is perhaps refreshing to one ac-
customed to the grosser "positivism" of our day that seems to dom-
inate all things. But it is only a momentary pleasure, for we have
to face such general peculiarities, not to say degeneracy, of con-
duct, of mind, and of heart among men that the mirage of an "in-
fallible oracle" soon vanishes in their mist, and the important ques-
tions of principles and of morals cannot be set aside as easily as
the skeptical positivist and the skeptical idealist would have us be-
lieve.
Vices and errors are of all times, but when there were firm
beliefs they were universally known without being universally com-
mon. Consciences were troubled though the flesh was weak ; the
best established maxims were susceptible of captious interpreta-
tions ; but, at least, there were common rules of conduct, a moral
code that was a law to all ; there was basic certainty.
Today all this is changed.
Religious faith has lost control over many, and its control over
others is of most doubtful tenure, no philosophical beliefs have re-
placed it, no civil or lay authority receives the respect that faith
used to call its own, there is a preponderance of democratic gov-
ernments—dependent upon all men, they no longer create opinions,
but are subject to them. All is in doubt, not only these principles
and systems of philosophy but even those individual inspirations of
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conscience to which some would have us subject all questions of
ethics, of morals.
But in all this the progress of skepticism is far from producing
absolute indifference, never have those questions of ethics and of
morals been debated so hotly and excited such general and keen
interest. They are the absorbing ones in public debate, political
caucus, the drama, our literature, and private conversation. If it be
a matter of international comity or of rights, yes, or peace or of
war, nations weigh other considerations in the scale than mere in-
terests ; they at least prate of justice, the most elevated notions of
generosity, protection of the weakly, etc. ; or, if it be party-strife,
there each reproaches the other with all that can be found against
it that is immoral or unjust, and it has effect with the people who,
however used they may be to corruption, or however unwilling to
change the order of things political, still desire the ideal ; or in
private life, that most of our acts are in harmony, whatever our
tehefs or our doubts, with hereditary traditions that are strong
in us.
Our crimes, our lesser sins are, as in times gone by, as at-
tributable to momentary passion, thoughtlessness, as they are to a
spirit of skeptical "Don't care", and they are more numerous than
in those times when men had far better defined codes.
Still, is it not astonishing to listen to the discussion anent these
crimes or lesser sins, the paradoxical justifications advanced for their
commission, their defence in the name of "advanced thought", that,
in nine cases out of ten, is undertaken by men who would shudder
at the thought of being guilty of them?
That same spirit obtains apologists, the able ones, for com-
mercial crimes, extortion and fraud, in the name of "business
methods", and impels us to laugh at what we term excesses of
probity, scruples—a conscience, public or private!
Then, again, in all such casuistic discussions, why is it that we,
in spite of our new definitions and upsetting of old maxims, are in-
variably carried on by some irresistible current to those old prin-
ciples that the positivist and the critic would have us believe are
condemned to an eternal oblivion? Is it merely an hereditary taint
not yet outgrown ?
Modern skepticism, forsooth ; absolute indifference ! Why,
these is hardly an assembly, a meeting of a few friends, a banquet,
the most frivolous "five o'clock tea", at which, at some time or
another, you will not hear the weightiest questions of ethics, of
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morals discussed, perhaps flippantly but discussed nevertheless, aye,
even as abstruse questions as that of the existence of God.
These old principles that crop out with such assiduity, con-
tradicted, or approved, show us how indelibly they are imprinted
upon the consciences of some persons, and at the same time how
little influence they have upon their. acts, and it is surprising indeed
to note how unconsciously we of today ignore the old necessity of
having one's conduct harmonize somewhat with one's principles
—
even modern principles. We are proud of our good thoughts, our
elevating ideals, our principles on paper, and do not blush to live
by a diametrically different code or the absence of all codes. We
naively and sincerely wish to be troubled neither in our beliefs nor
in our pleasures. In real life, as in the play or in our reading, we
despise the traitor and applaud the hero ; not merely for art's sake,
but because we are in accord with and feel attracted to the good.
But what shall we deduce from all these strange contrasts in
contemporaneous conscience? We certaintly cannot depend upon
any professed principles to reach any conclusion. Yet we must
not imagine that those self-same principles count as nought. If
many set aside, disdainfully, sometimes with asperity, the traditional
basic ethics and religious dogmas there are also many who preserve
them most sacredly, even though their acts do not always bear wit-
ness to their beliefs. Then there are those "of the great majority"
who are neither completely absorbed into skepticism nor yet en-
tirely ruled by principles. These principles, therefore, continue,
between the believers, the skeptics and the middle-of-the-road philo-
sophers, to be the principal points of contention and at the same
time agreement. We may say they form a most unstable founda-
tion, but it will take much digging and blasting yet to prove it such
to those who have resolutely built thereupon, or who fear to extend
their structures of thought much beyond its lines.
Some have sought to establish another code, outside of previous
ones, more substantial, upon a better foundation of facts, that all
men can be in accord upon—common ground. Facts, human nature
studied as is a positive, an applied and known science, by psychology,
by physiology, by anthropology, and by history. These cannot be
principles in the metaphysical sense, but rather, as Spencer calls
them, "the data of ethics". Two insurmountable obstacles confront
them all, however: First, there is no common accord in what is
understood by "human nature". According to spiritualistic, ideal
psychologists, morals, consciences are inherent in the nature of man
;
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it is what distinguishes him from the lower animals. The difference,
again, is but of degree, "a chimerical distinction" claim the material-
ists, the positivists. There is a difference between man and the
lower animal, say they, but the difference in degree in animal evolu-
tion, as between the highest development and the lowest faculties of
the mind, or "soul'', and only in the successive periods of the double
evolution working through all creation since all time and in each
individual during the brief period of his life. And these differences
will always exist so long as there are psychologists to contend as to
"free-agency" against the distinction as between reason and the in-
stincts, the soul and the body of man and of the animal.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that that difficulty
should be disposed of ; are we very far advanced in the solution of
the question of morals?
It is not merely a case of what is man and what are the laws
of his nature, but it is far more what he should do in deference to
a law of individual character that is not always obeyed necessarily,
but that commands in no uncertain terms nevertheless. There is no
common accord upon the moral qualifications of an act. One con-
demns it, the other condones, if he does not approve it. But Nature,
in its general laws, is the same with the one as with the other ; one
acts one way, while the other without any violent metamorphosis
does the contrary and each is assured that he is right. Would you
suggest personal interests merged into the greater good? And do
you make any distinction between pleasures, for instance, and claim,
with John Stuart Mill, that there are degrees, that a hog cannot
be as happy as a refined, intelligent, sensitive human being? You
cannot distinguish between pleasures any more than you can be-
tween moral acts except in the former case by their degree of in-
tensity, and in the latter by the way they impress your moral sense.
Whatever may be the destiny of naturalistic ethics, it is certain
that a great majority of us continue their claims, and will continue
to make them for a long time to come ; that these questions are of a
higher order than mere material interests ; that this solution is un-
necessary, they are established ; we can but obey the laws and live
up to the code laid down by the Fathers, believe in the existence of
a God and the immortality of the soul, and all is well
!
And it is most legitimate that all the efforts of the churches
should l)e to prop our conscience, our moral sense, as it were, against
their dogmas, their creeds.
You may say these are l)Ut fragile supports, and that their weak-
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ness is most manifest in these times when luke-warmness is so com-
mon, even amongst the "true beHevers", the faithful, and that it is
a confounding of universal moral rectitude with the individual in-
terests of each church, that it authorizes that monstrous conclusion
that there is no bond or tie betwixt the believer and the heretic and
that all those separated from the church are as exempt from all
moral as they are from ecclesiastical control.
It is right here that the so-called liberal churches have done
much good, by throwing a mantle of more ample fold around those
who fretted in the rather close-fitting garments of orthodoxy, and
at the same time exerting a liberalizing influence even upon those
older churches, resulting in the establishing of closer bonds between
all men and a more common code of public morals—a step in the
direction of the "brotherhood of man".
But even the old theology may answer that it is in matters of
faith that men differ the least ; that all the unbelievers together agree
upon exceedingly few doubts ; that it penetrates regions and souls,
for their good, where positivists and materialists never dream of
going, and that today, in these very irreligious times, conversions to
its dogmas are frequent, oft'times among the most enlightened, the
greatest thinkers, and that in times when its downfall seemed most
assured while nations awoke to great and unexpected religious re-
vivals.
A strange world, indeed!
Theological ethics do not necessarily exclude natural, rational,
philosophical ones. Faith in all great religious bodies goes hand in
hand with Conscience—sometimes with Reason.
There is danger here, not in theology, however, but in its ap-
plication ; the tendency—and a natural enough one—of those in au-
thority is to be more solicitous for the interests of the Faith than
those of mere morality ; they are ever ready to excuse lapses for
fear of scaring away souls by a too exacting application of the code.
Yet we are prone to exaggerate the scandalous contrasts these con-
ditions do create, and to wrongly attribute them to hypocrisy rather
than to what may be in part, at least, good policy.
The search after and discussion of moral principles belongs as
legitimately to all churches as to all philosophies and schools ; but
a code of morals purely theological hardly seems sufficient or de-
sirable for either church or. society. New elements of morality must
develop with the progress of ideas. We had to open our minds to
tolerance before tolerance became a factor in our customs.
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Progressive ethics are necessarily mobile, and their authority,
always open to discussion, is as necessarily unstable as their evolu-
tion is progressive. A weakness, if you wish, yet, paradoxical as it
may seem, a very element of strength. Was it not Kant who, while
he recognized in the existence of a God and of a future life two
conditions necessary to morality, was yet well pleased that neither
proposition could withstand a too searching analysis? He wanted
his God and his Eternity to be wonderful, awful, and thought it
dangerous to dispel any of the mysticism and clouds that surrounded
both.
One of the greatest dangers to morals is to wrap their ethics
about with too binding formulas, accepted in all confidence, as
oracles of divine wisdom. The most exact formulas fail to cover
specific cases. Acts become legal without being moral. A moral
act must conform to the spirit as well as to the mere letter of a
formula and one can enter into the real spirit of a thing only by
going back to its very principle, its source.
Morality can but begin when we have risen above the merely
literal observance of its decrees. Nothing can so clearly show the
insufficiency of formulas as the philosophical doubts and the seri-
ous discussions of which they are the subjects.
No precept or principle is vast enough to take in or to regulate
all our actions. Consciences require personal acts, initiative and in-
dependent, to test these principles.
It is by such efforts that nobly liberal spirits have in all times
created the reactions against abuses and false maxims generally ad-
mitted and sustained by all about them, even by their own doctrines
and tendencies.
Philosophical doubts should extend even into one's self.
Thought and Analysis should be the jury before which we try our
"reasonable doubts", our "impulses of the heart", as well as the ac-
cepted maxims, creeds, formulas and all else about us.
But, then, philosophical thought and the weighing of ethics, of
morals, of maxims, are confined to so few that it becomes a very
duty, and today particularly, for all who do think to call attention
to the meritorious in philosophical systems, to the evolution of ethics.
The thinking man may hope, and that without any unappreciation
of the limitations of thought, to ever enlarge its sphere, its scope,
by its very force to carry further and further the subordination of
Nature even to their ideals, moral and social, and, in consequence
thereof, to carry onward the evolution, the progress we should all
THE EVOI.UTTON OF ETHICS. 29
Strive for from the lower to the higher. With Fouillee we may ex-
claim, when we see Science confronted with the enigma of the
origin of the world, "Ignorabimus !" but when Morals confront the
enigma of the destiny of the world we may with equal justice ex-
claim "Sperabimus !"
